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Consider the following two cases.
Case 1: Activists from New York City are angry. They are angry because 
they have been discriminated against and mistreated because of their race. 
Their calls for attention have not gotten them a proper response from 
political leaders. Therefore, they march on the streets, wave their signs, and 
demand—in anger—that things change. A person tuning in from Small-
ville witnesses their anger on television. In response, the Smallville resi-
dent disapproves of the individual activists’ anger. The resident responds, 
“She has no real reason to be angry. Come on, he is just too darn angry! 
Besides, this anger is not going to change anything. It will only turn people 
off. They should use another approach.”
Case 2: Activists from Smallville are angry. They are angry because of the 
high unemployment rates in their state and the closing of several industries 
in their towns. They have felt ignored by political leaders. Therefore, they 
decide to march on the streets, waving their signs in support of a candidate 
whom they believe will address their concerns. The same person from 
Case 1 tunes in and witnesses their anger on television. In response, the 
Smallville resident approves of the individual activists’ anger. The resident 
responds, “That’s right, he has a right to be angry. Maybe this time, folks 
will listen. I feel for her. People need to understand where they are coming 
from.”
How might we account for this difference in anger judgments? What might 
we say about the person who has a pattern of judging anger in this way? What 
evaluative errors, if any, is the Smallville resident committing in these cases? 
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And what might we learn about anger and ourselves as a result of interrogat-
ing these questions?
In this chapter I will give an account of how our judgments of anger often 
play out in instances like the earlier cases. While contemporary philosophers 
of emotion have provided us with check box guides like “fittingness” and 
“size” for evaluating anger, I will argue that these guides do not by them-
selves help us escape the tendency to mark or unmark the boxes selectively, 
inconsistently, and erroneously. If anger—particularly anger in a political 
context—can provide information and spark positive change or political 
destruction, then we have moral reasons to evaluate it properly. But can we? 
And what are the limitations and errors we often face when evaluating anger?
I will begin by laying out the ways in which we evaluate emotions and the 
moral and epistemic errors we attribute to the angry agent in judgments of 
disapproval. Then I attempt to answer the question: How do we judge politi-
cal anger improperly? An improper evaluation, in my view, does not take into 
account relevant information that is needed to evaluate the anger. An overly 
generous, uninformed, biased, or selfish process of evaluation produces an 
improper evaluation. We see this occur when we immediately evaluate anger. 
I will also identify two social discursive practices of improper evaluation 
as well as the moral and epistemic errors committed when anger evaluators 
participate in these practices.
EVALUATING EMOTIONS
I will first argue that in the aforementioned cases, the Smallville resident is 
engaged in an evaluation of anger. Whether it is a proper or improper evalu-
ation is an issue that I will take up later. When an anger evaluation occurs, 
the evaluator engages in a process of determining if the angry agent has 
committed or omitted certain epistemic and moral errors.1 The evaluator does 
this when she judges that the anger is or is not intelligible, appropriate, or 
proportionate.
“Anger” is an umbrella term for a range of emotions, including rage, irrita-
tion, and indignation. Anger does not always depend on the judgment that a 
moral offense has occurred. I can be upset that it has rained. My classmate 
can irritate me by the questions he asks. In these examples, the causes of my 
anger are not moral wrongs. Moral anger, on the other hand, is “irritation that 
occurs when a moral norm has been violated, especially a norm pertaining to 
harm” (Prinz 2010: 535). The anger in Cases 1 and 2 is an example of moral 
anger. Angry agents in Case 1 are angry at discrimination. Angry agents in 
Case 2 are angry at economic neglect.
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Moral anger plays a role in negative evaluation. When angry we evaluate 
that something has gone wrong. In contrast, when joyful we evaluate that 
something has gone wonderfully well. Moral anger is also an emotion of 
blame, is other-directed, and is associated with change or punishment (Lorde 
1997; Prinz 2010). When morally angry at wrongdoers, we blame them for 
their role in the transgression. The targets of our anger are others. On the 
other hand, the target of our guilt is not our classmates but ourselves. Because 
moral anger is associated with change, we may also desire to pursue justice 
when morally angry. In Cases 1 and 2, angry agents desire that things change 
or that those in political power pay attention to their needs.
If anger plays a role in negative evaluation then when we criticize or praise 
someone’s anger, we are evaluating an evaluation (Prinz 2010: 5). We evalu-
ate anger according to its intelligibility, appropriateness, and proportionality.2
When determining if a case of moral anger is intelligible, we ask, “What 
is its object?” Moral anger is intelligible if it has an object. It is unintelligible 
if it does not. For example, moral anger is intelligible if an agent is angry 
about something. It will be unintelligible if when asked “What are you angry 
about?” the person replies, “At nothing.”3
When determining if the anger is appropriate or fitting, we want to know 
if the anger fits the world or if it fails to fit the world (Goldie 2000: 200). 
This is an epistemic concern. We want to know if the object of the anger (the 
violation of moral norms) actually exists. Did racial discrimination actually 
occur? Evaluating a case of moral anger as inappropriate is evaluating that 
an epistemic error has occurred. We judge that angry agents have gotten the 
world wrong. Discrimination did not in fact happen. Economic injustice did 
not in fact occur. In judging the moral anger as inappropriate, we may also 
judge that angry agents have made a moral error. If I am angry only with 
one party when I know both parties are to blame, then by not being angry 
with both I have made a moral error—for being angry with one party is unfair 
(Roberts 2010: 565).
Moral anger can also be proportionate or disproportionate. It is proportion-
ate if it is the sort or level of angry response that is required. In Aristotle’s 
sense, it is about being angry to the right degree. We may judge that a per-
son’s raging response to a raindrop on his or her forehead is disproportionate 
anger. The raindrop—which is bound to disappear as soon as one recognizes 
it—does not warrant such a strong response. We may conclude that a person’s 
intense anger at a hit-and-run driver is proportionate given the gravity of the 
wrongdoing and the harm.
When we evaluate the anger of others, we may also judge that a character 
error has occurred. When we think about a person with good character, we 
look at not only what he or she does in the world but also his or her emotional 
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life. We judge a person with good character to have certain dispositions to 
have emotions (e.g., to have compassion at another’s suffering), to overcome 
or master some emotions (e.g., anger that reaches “the mean”), and to not 
have emotions of certain types (e.g., envy) (Roberts 2010). Therefore, when 
we evaluate a person’s moral anger, we are also evaluating his or her char-
acter. When judging moral anger as disproportionate, we may take the angry 
agent to be the kind of person who cannot control his or her anger. In judging 
moral anger as proportionate, we may judge the angry as being the sort of 
person who is angry at the right time and to the right degree.
In evaluating moral anger, we could also judge that the angry agent has 
made a strategy error. If moral anger has a particular utility in that it can 
encourage cooperation, fairness, and adherence to certain norms, then if 
I know the goals of the angry agent and I am familiar with how to achieve 
them, I may judge that the anger will be constructive or destructive to such 
goals. In Case 1, the Smallville resident suggests that the anger will not 
change anything, while in Case 2, the resident suggests that the anger will 
lead people to listen. In Case 1 the evaluator judges that a strategy error 
occurred. However, the evaluator does not judge that it occurred in Case 2. 
Anger is, rather, a good strategy according to the evaluator.
If these are our standards for evaluating emotions, why is it often difficult 
to evaluate anger properly? I am of the view that when patterns of asym-
metrical anger judgments between “our” group and distant others occur, they 
uniquely reveal that the difficulty is not necessarily due to the particular anger 
in those cases but rather to other determinants. What these determinants are 
is what I aim to explore in what follows. In the next two sections I consider 
several possibilities: the anger difficulty, the sympathy gap, anger policing, 
and gaslighting.
THE “ANGER DIFFICULTY”
I will first describe the problem with evaluating anger as opposed to other 
emotions. I will argue that anger is distinctively difficult to immediately 
approve or disapprove. I am persuaded by Adam Smith’s account of sympa-
thy; therefore, in what follows I describe his account of how sympathy influ-
ences the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation.
How do we come to approve or disapprove of emotions? It is through 
what Smith refers to as “sympathy.” We imagine what it would be like if we 
were them. Why are we able to sympathize with and therefore approve of 
the grief or joy of others for example? Smith thinks it is because “the very 
appearances of grief and joy . . . suggest to us the general ideal of some good 
or bad fortune” (Smith 1976, TMS I.i.I.7: 11). When we see the happiness of 
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another, we imagine the cause of the happiness and it can likewise “inspire us 
with some degree of the like emotions.” We begin to imagine that something 
great has happened. We imagine what it will be like to experience the same 
cause and we too become happy. If we witness someone grieving, we too can 
become sorrowful. This is because both joy and sorrow suggest a cause: good 
or bad fortunes.4
Although Smith describes this sympathy at this point as imperfect because 
of the vague idea of the person’s fortunes or misfortunes, the spectator has 
sympathy for the happy or sorrowful person and therefore approves of the 
emotion. Not all passions, however, are transfused antecedent to any specific 
knowledge of what excited it. Some passions require the spectator to be 
familiar with the occasion that brought the passion about before any sympa-
thy and thus approval can occur. Anger is such a passion.
When we see an angry person, his anger is more likely to make us look 
at him in fear or disgust. We tend to instead sympathize with the fear of the 
person with whom he is angry than with the angry man. This is because we 
“plainly see what is the situation of those with whom he is angry, and to 
what violence they may be exposed to” (Smith 1976, TMS I.i.I.8: 11). Here 
we see the situation (the angry man) that has brought his fear about and are 
thus able to sympathize with the fearful person. In order for us to sympathize 
with the angry man, we must become acquainted with his provocation. The 
appearance of his anger does not suggests to us the general idea that good or 
bad fortunes have befallen him. People are often angry for no reason or for 
reasons that do not always warrant anger. Witnessing the angry man does not 
inform us of the cause of his anger. Absent of this information, we cannot 
“bring his case home to ourselves, nor conceive anything like the passions 
which it excites” (Smith 1976, TMS I.i.I.7: 11).
Smith notes that when passions of another person are in “perfect concord” 
with the sympathetic emotions of my own, I judge it as just, proper, and suit-
able to the object. When they are not in perfect concord with my sympathetic 
emotions, I judge the passions as unjust, improper, and unsuitable. If I cannot 
feel the emotion another feels (to some degree), I cannot avoid disapprov-
ing of that person’s sentiments. If I sympathize with Hakeem’s sorrow (e.g., 
I know that his mother has just died), I will also approve of his sorrow and 
judge it proper. If I cannot sympathize with Ivy’s joy (e.g., perhaps I know 
that the cause of her joy is the death of another), I will disapprove of her joy 
and judge it improper.
When we immediately disapprove of the anger of another, this disapproval 
is such because we do not have an “I know” that puts the anger in context. 
The cause of the anger is not available to us, or given the cause, we cannot 
imagine that we too would be angry if we were the angry agent. We are unable 
to sympathize as a result. What we cannot sympathize with, we disapprove of. 
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This disapproval is based on the anger’s dissonance with our own sentiments. 
To approve or disapprove of people’s anger is to assert an agreement or dis-
agreement of our own sentiments with theirs. Smith writes:
To approve or disapprove, therefore, of the opinions of others is acknowledged, 
by every body, to mean no more than to observe their agreement or disagree-
ment with our own. But this is equally the case with regard to our approbation 
or disapprobation of the sentiments or passions of others. (Smith 1976, TMS 
I.i.3.2: 17)
We are not prone to sympathize with anger before we are informed of its 
cause. Smith continues.
When we blame in another man the excesses of love, of grief, of resentment, 
we not only consider the ruinous effects which they tend to produce, but the 
little occasion which was given for them . . . we say . . . his misfortune is not so 
dreadful, his provocation is not so extraordinary, as to justify so violent a pas-
sion. We should have indulged, we say; perhaps, have approved of the violence 
of his emotion, had the cause been in any respect proportioned to it. (Smith 
1976, TMS I.i.3.8: 18)
Another reason why we may immediately disapprove of anger more than 
other emotions like fear is its immediate effects. The effects of resentment 
are often mischief. Because the immediate effects are disagreeable, “even 
when they are most justly provoked, there is still something about them 
which disgusts us” (Smith 1976, TMS I.ii.3.5: 36). Anger is difficult to 
immediately approve of, unlike other emotions, because its cause is unknown 
and its effects can be harmful. But note that the source of the puzzle of Case 
1 and Case 2 is not that both cases of anger were immediately disapproved 
of but rather only Case 1 was. How might the anger difficulty speak to this 
asymmetry?
The anger difficulty demonstrates that we cannot judge all cases of anger 
immediately in the proper way. Information that is needed is often not avail-
able and cannot be adequately assumed in “immediate” cases. For example, 
political anger often has a proximate cause (e.g., death of Tamir Rice) and 
historical causes (e.g., history of police violence). If an evaluator is not famil-
iar with either of these causes or is familiar with just one of them, she may 
not immediately approve of the political anger.
The difficulty also shows that the effects of anger, in general, can put a 
stain on a particular expression of anger. For example, if anger is believed to 
make people “fly off the handle” and enact violence, then an evaluator may 
use these effects to judge particular cases of anger. I also think that if we 
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believe “we know” how certain groups will respond (effects) we may be more 
willing to approve or disapprove of their anger—even if it is only predictive. 
For example, if we have confidence that an angry person will not take his or 
her anger and use it to commit violent crimes, we may approve of the anger. 
However, if we believe a person will take his or her anger and use it to hurt 
others, we may disapprove of it. Nevertheless, this belief is often informed 
by overconfidence in our ability to predict behavior, and in some cases, it is 
informed by certain stereotypes of people and groups. Both are unreliable 
and have harmful implications. A proper evaluation will entail evaluating the 
anger in the context of actual effects.
THE SYMPATHY GAP
Not only is anger difficult to immediately sympathize with and thus approve, 
but we are also limited in whose anger we can immediately sympathize with. 
According to Smith, our sympathies are usually extended to those within 
our immediate families, a little less to friends and neighbors, less to those in 
other cities, and very weakly for all of humanity. Smith writes that we are 
first recommended to our own care. After ourselves comes our immediate 
family—those we live with.
Smith notes that we are more likely to sympathize with them for several 
reasons. He writes, “[Everyman] knows better how every thing is likely to 
affect them, and his sympathy with them is more precise and determinate, 
than it can be with the greater part of other people. It approaches nearer, in 
short, to what he feels for himself” (Smith 1976, TMS VI.iii.1.2: 219). We 
do not sympathize more with our immediate family than others because of 
biology but rather because we are more habituated to sympathize with them. 
Smith adds:
The earliest friendships, the friendships which are naturally contracted when the 
heart is most susceptible of that feeling, are those among brothers and sisters. 
Their good agreement, while they remain in the same family, is necessary for its 
tranquility and happiness. They are capable of giving more pleasure or pain to 
one another than to the greater part of other people. Their situation renders their 
mutual sympathy of the utmost importance to their common happiness; and, 
by the wisdom of nature, the same situation, by obliging them to accommodate 
to one another, renders that sympathy more habitual, and thereby more lively, 
more distinct, and more determinate. (Smith 1976, TMS VI.ii.1.4: 219–220)
The sympathy between these brothers and sisters does not exist because they 
share the same DNA but because they live very close to each other. Smith 
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thinks that this kind of sympathy would not exist between siblings who are 
estranged or between those we have never met. He writes that other biologi-
cal relationships such as those between us and our nieces and nephews would 
also have a weaker sympathy. This is because “their mutual sympathy is less 
necessary, so it is less habitual, and therefore proportionally weaker.”
Evolutionary biology and modern psychology support Smith’s claim that 
our sympathies are usually extended to those within our immediate families 
and those who are close to us than those who are distant. Humans developed 
in small groups and developed close bonds within them. They relied on each 
other against the threat of outsiders. Psychology tells us that humans need 
strong family bonds because of the security and self-respect these bonds pro-
vide. Humans also need close bonds outside of families in order to gain con-
fidence and a stronger sense of identity. There are also moral advantages to 
sympathy within concentric circles. We are able to help those who are close 
to us. We are also able to know how to help them because of our familiarity 
with them. Close bonds within small groups also allow us to receive moral 
correction from others that is more nuanced and suited to who we are. The 
corrections are more informed and are backed by concern for our interests.5
This sympathy gap explains why we are more prone to immediately sym-
pathize and thus approve of the political anger of those close to us than with 
the anger of distant others. However, sympathy within our concentric circles 
can lead us to the asymmetrical judgment in Cases 1 and 2. The Smallville 
resident is able to immediately sympathize and therefore approve of the anger 
of his fellow residents because they are within his “circle.” The resident lives 
and works around the Smallville protestors; therefore, it may be easier to 
imagine what it would be like if he were them. However, he is not able to 
sympathize with the anger of diverse New Yorkers. He is not aware of, is not 
familiar with, or cannot relate to their struggles that brought about the anger. 
Moreover, the struggles of a group of New Yorkers do not appear to have a 
direct effect on both the Smallville resident and the New Yorkers’ common 
and mutual happiness. As a result, he is unable to immediately sympathize 
with their anger although he is able to immediately sympathize with Small-
ville residents.
My emphasis in these last two sections has been on the immediate evalu-
ation of anger and how anger, in general, and distance (physical, affective, 
and cultural), in particular, can affect our anger evaluations. This is not an 
endorsement of speedy anger evaluation. Because our political fellows do 
not typically experience one episode of anger but several and because we are 
not morally obligated to evaluate anger as soon as it is displayed, we are not 
required to produce proper evaluations of anger immediately. A proper anger 
evaluation will require time. In the next two sections I will lay out how we 
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often erroneously shortcut this process or do it insincerely—even when given 
the time to do so—through two practices: anger policing and gaslighting.
ANGER POLICING
What accounts for why we disapprove of anger in Case 1 but then approve 
of anger in Case 2? After reading the previous section, one might think the 
answer is that the angry agents in Case 1 did not pass the sympathy test while 
angry agents in Case 2 did. However, I think this is not all that is happening 
nor is it all that can happen when evaluating anger. I will argue that the disap-
proval of anger in Case 1—even after one gets more time to evaluate—may 
be due to moral and epistemic errors of the evaluator. Although these errors 
may not be intentional, they are often made in ways that affect the evaluator’s 
ability to properly judge anger.
I have argued in the beginning of this chapter that evaluations of anger are 
also judgments that angry agents have or have not made moral and epistemic 
errors. However, angry agents are not the only ones who commit these errors. 
Anger evaluators can also make them. In what follows, I will lay out the vari-
ety of ways these errors are made in response to political anger. I argue that 
anger evaluators make these errors through the discursive social practices of 
anger policing and gaslighting. This is not to deny that other practices or less 
subtle or innocent mistakes are not at work. However, given limited space 
here, I will focus only on these two.
Although the person who polices anger is making judgments of appropri-
ateness and proportionality, I will show that he or she is doing it improperly. 
The anger policing evaluator does it improperly by making the very presence 
of anger a reason for disapproval, insincerely dictating the terms of the dis-
cussion with the goal of ignoring the wrongdoing, and being only concerned 
with his or her own feelings and thus is unwilling to sympathize.
First, when an evaluator polices anger, instead of judging if the particular 
instance of anger is intelligible, appropriate, or proportionate based on infor-
mation, the very presence of the anger gives the evaluator reason to judge it 
with disapproval. By anger policing, he or she fails to give evaluative atten-
tion to the cause. However, knowing the cause is important for evaluating 
if the anger is appropriate. In addition, rather than the cause, it is the very 
presence of the anger—no matter its degree—that makes it disproportionate 
for the evaluator.
In response, anger evaluators then attempt to get the angry agent to 
change his or her angry emotional response by suggesting that it is the only 
means by which he or she will be heard. This is a moral mistake in that the 
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evaluator—instead of respecting the expression of another—aims to get the 
angry agent to express his or her discontent only on the evaluator’s terms. 
Anger policing (and tone policing in general) is therefore also performed 
when an anger evaluator dictates the terms to which people should be heard. 
A person who polices the anger of others dictates the ways the politically 
angry talk about their experiences. Audre Lorde provides an example of anger 
policing when she writes:
I speak out of direct and particular anger at an academic conference, and a white 
woman says, “Tell me how you feel but don’t say it too harshly or I cannot hear 
you.” But is it my manner that keeps her from hearing, or the threat of a message 
that her life may change? (Lorde 1997: 278)
Here the anger evaluator is dictating the terms of the engagement. The evalu-
ator suggests that unless the anger disappears, the evaluator cannot hear the 
message. However, this is often insincere. The evaluator, in policing anger, 
does not want to hear the moral argument. Rather, the evaluator dismisses the 
cause of the anger altogether. However, the evaluator needs the cause in order 
to evaluate if the anger is intelligible, appropriate, or proportionate. Anger 
policing is often used to derail or deflect away from the injustice or oppres-
sion (the cause) that the angry agent desires to bring attention to. As Lorde 
claims, it is not the anger itself that keeps one from hearing. It is the message 
within the anger. The anger serves as an excuse to dismiss it.
Third, a person who polices the anger of others is also often insensitive to the 
experiences of others. This is a character error. What is important for the person 
who participates in policing is not what angry agents say but how the evalua-
tor feels about how the angry agent says it (Poland 2016: 46–47). The policing 
evaluators prioritize style over the substance of the moral grievance. Evaluators 
who police anger are concerned with how the anger makes them feel more than 
the feelings and experiences of those who believe they have good reason to be 
angry.
Perhaps in Case 1, the evaluator in witnessing the anger of the individual 
activists felt uncomfortable, perhaps even afraid in response to the anger. In 
addition, an anger policing evaluator may not approve of the anger because it 
makes him or her feel guilty about his or her complicity in privilege, or it may 
shatter his or her idea of the world, thereby making him or her feel unsafe or 
insecure. Therefore, in anger policing, anger is not only always inappropriate 
but also always disproportionate. Anger, for the evaluator, is always felt and 
thus evaluated as too intense, too much, and too loud that it blocks the evalu-
ator from hearing anything the angry has to say.
We ought not to confuse this concern for how it makes the evaluator feel 
with sympathizing. In Smithian sympathy, we imagine what it would be like 
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if we were them. If we can sympathize (or feel like passion), then we approve 
of the sentiment. However, this “feeling” is different from the feeling of the 
evaluator who polices anger. The evaluator who polices anger wants to feel 
better and is not interested in placing himself or herself in the shoes of others 
in order to feel what angry agents feel so that he or she can understand the 
anger and thus approve or disapprove of it. On the contrary, the evaluator 
who polices anger is not willing to sympathize. He or she aims only to elimi-
nate not properly evaluate the anger.
I do not want to imply that any criticism of anger is an act of policing. Just 
because an evaluator has disapproved of anger does not mean that he or she 
has policed the anger. The critic becomes an anger policing evaluator only 
when he or she judges the anger to be unintelligible, inappropriate, and dis-
proportionate because it is anger, dictates the terms to which the angry can be 
heard, and prioritizes his or her own feelings of discomfort of witnessing the 
anger over the feelings of angry agents experiencing the cause of the anger. 
Also being doubtful of anger’s place in morality and in the political sphere 
may make one an anger skeptic, but it does not make one an anger policing 
evaluator. The critic must engage in specific acts in order to be said to par-
ticipate in the practice.
Anger policing also usually operates within a double standard. Note in 
Case 1 that the evaluator says, “Besides, this anger is not going to change 
anything. It will only turn people off,” while in Case 2 the evaluator says, 
“Maybe this time, folks will listen.” In policing anger, an evaluator’s anger 
or their group’s anger can be appropriate but other people’s anger—because 
they are “the other”—is always suspicious, inappropriate, and should be 
replace with civility.
Unfortunately, anger policing produces a feedback loop (McKinnon 2017). 
Imagine you were told to calm down for being angry. It would only make you 
angrier. Implying that angry agents cannot be heard because of their anger 
only makes them angrier when they speak. June Jordan makes this point when 
she says, “If you make and keep my life horrible then, when I can tell the 
truth, it will be a horrible truth; it will not sound good or look good or, God 
willing, feel good for you either” (Jordan 1981: 180). Unfortunately, this may 
provide reason for a judgment of disproportionateness because now it really 
does appear that the anger is too much.
In particular cases of anger policing, the evaluator may seek to persuade 
the angry agent to accept calm and civility instead of anger as the standard 
for discourse. At times this suggestion may be warranted particularly if there 
is chaos and no one is being heard because of shouting or violence. However, 
I think people can be angry in a deliberative context and yet still be respectful 
and peaceful. My concern is not that calm and civility is being recommended 
as a solution to a disorganized and chaotic context. I am concerned with anger 
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policing evaluators using “calm and civility” to assert their power over others 
and as a way to silence others.
Joan W. Scott (2015) argues that the notion of civility has and is a word 
that defines and demarcates power differentials. Those in positions of power 
have always determined how civility is defined. As David Palumbo-Liu 
(2014) writes, “Civility is in the eye of the powerful.” It is often people who 
are most vulnerable to and victimized by unjust and oppressive systems who 
are punished for speaking their angry truth and recommended to be civil 
when they express anger. Jordan continues:
The people whose very existence is most endangered and, therefore, most in 
need of vigilantly truthful affirmation, these are the people — the poor and the 
children — who are punished most severely for departures from the civilities that 
grease oppression. (Jordan 1981: 180)
Defining civility is not only in the hands of those who are more powerfully 
positioned, but the line that separates civility from incivility is oftentimes 
arbitrarily moved until it becomes an unattainable standard for anyone to 
meet. This, therefore, makes it difficult for angry agents to ever be calm or 
civil enough for the policing evaluator. This contributes to the silencing of 
angry agents and their moral concerns.
The dissident claims of minority groups go unheard in the public sphere when 
they are tagged as departures from the protocols of style and decorum— 
dismissed as evidence of irrationality and so placed outside the realm of what 
is taken to be reasoned deliberation. They are, by definition, uncivil, and thus 
beneath contempt. Once a certain space or style of argument is identified 
as civil, the implication is that dissenters from it are uncivilized. “Civility” 
becomes a synonym for orthodoxy; “incivility” designates unorthodox ideas or 
behavior. (Scott 2015)
Such silencing is a form of what Kristie Dotson (2011) refers to as “epistemic 
violence” in that it “attempts to eliminate knowledge” by making it the case 
that certain groups cannot be heard. Such ignorance can be harmful, for the 
angry agents’ courage or agency has now been undermined. This is an epis-
temic error made by the anger evaluator.
The anger policing evaluator in determining such strict (and possibly 
insincere) rules of civil engagement sans anger also demarcates power differ-
entials by making it the case that those with less power have to always come 
up to meet the evaluator’s high standards of engagement instead of the anger 
evaluator coming down to meet angry agents where they are.
Given the aims and strategies of the anger policing evaluator, we have 
tools to differentiate the anger police from proper evaluators of anger. Any 
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criticism of anger does not make one guilty of being an anger policing evalu-
ator. While Martin Luther King Jr., for example, may at times thought that 
one was making a strategy mistake with anger, he did not judge anger based 
on its presence alone, nor was he unwilling to sympathize with the anger of 
others or listen to angry blacks because they were in fact angry. He refused 
to silence the angry although he may have disagreed with anger as a political 
strategy. Anger policing is a practice made up of actions with specific aims. 
It is a practice that not only produces judgments of disapprobation but also 
reaches those judgments through a process of improper evaluation grounded 
in bias, ignorance, and selfishness.
GASLIGHTING
Gaslighting is another practice that involves an improper evaluation of anger. 
“Gaslighting” is a term that originated from the 1944 movie Gaslight in 
which the protagonist tries to convince his wife that she is suffering from 
delusions and is thus insane. He does this with the aim of having her hospital-
ized so that he can take hold of her jewels. Gaslighting as a practice is a tool 
used to make a person doubt his or her perceptions and to not take himself or 
herself seriously as an interlocutor. Gaslighters do not just want the world to 
seem a certain way, but they want you to see it that way (Abramson 2014). 
Although there are different methods and techniques of gaslighting, examples 
of gaslighting as it involves anger include the following:
Gaslighting Case 1
An undergrad witnesses racist behavior from his teacher’s assistant. Being quite 
angry with the TA, the student sets up a meeting with the TA to discuss the mat-
ter. The TA responds to the angry complaint by saying, “You are imagining that 
what I said was racist. My behavior wasn’t that bad. If you were not a sensitive 
snow-flake who gets crazy ideas of racism from the media, we would not be 
having this conversation.” He then says to the undergrad that he understands 
that being the only Arab American student in class may make him sensitive to 
issues of race but he assured the student, “You have nothing to really be angry 
or worried about. Everyone is not out to get you.”
Gaslighting Case 2
Imagine that instead of the Smallville resident in Case 1 watching television, 
the evaluator has an actual encounter with an angry black protestor who is also 
a friend. In their private encounter, the black friend expresses anger at the con-
stant police mistreatment of black women and finds it to be quite systematic. 
She is angry that it is not getting the attention it deserves and that officers are not 
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being charged. The Smallville evaluator responds, “I don’t think it is as system-
atic as you think and it is surely not worth all the emotional labor you are putting 
into it.” He also says, “Why do you have such a victim mindset. White people 
are killed by the police too. Calm down. Don’t be such an angry black woman.”
The preceding gaslighting examples have a basic three-part structure. First, 
the angry agents are framed as overreacting or oversensitive and thus cannot 
be the source of genuine disagreement (Abramson 2014: 14). They “have 
nothing to be angry about.” Regardless of what the student witnessed, the 
TA questions his memory. The Smallville resident is confident that things 
are not as systematic as the angry friend claims it is. Second, as a gaslighter, 
the Smallville resident tells the angry agent that this is how he sees her in the 
form of a command—e.g., “Don’t be such an angry black woman.” Third, the 
gaslighter also insists on the dismissive framework in the interactions when 
he notes, “Everyone is not out to get you!” (ibid.).
This three-part structure also has a goal. The gaslighter, intentionally or 
unintentionally, aims to get the person to not take himself or herself seriously, 
for the gaslighter will have the agent think that the anger stems from pathol-
ogy or a weakness of emotionality rather than the facts of the matter. The 
evaluator is not interested in the cause or reason for the anger because if he 
paid attention to the reason he might find the anger intelligible or appropriate. 
However, a person who gaslights an angry agent aims to convince the agent 
that the anger is unwarranted because there is no object. The agent is always 
mistaken and always imagining the cause. Legitimate concerns are therefore 
illegitimate. The gaslighting evaluator denies—without any evidence—that 
a real reason exists for the anger; therefore, he discounts the anger as unreal 
(Cherry 2016). Gaslighting does not just undermine the anger, but it also 
undermines the negative evaluation the anger makes, thereby rendering the 
anger as always “uncalled for” or inappropriate.
If there is an object, the anger is still an overreaction because the wrong-
doer is overgenerously assumed to not have meant it in the way the angry 
agent experienced it. The fault of the anger is always the angry agent and not 
something in the world. It is the student’s sensitivity to racial matters that 
is the reason for why he is angry. It is the fact that the woman has a victim 
mindset and is a black woman that she is angry. Racial injustice and racist 
behavior are never “real enough” to be taken as reasons for anger. This leads 
to an ever-present negative evaluation of the anger.
For the gaslighting evaluator, the anger more often than not has a biologi-
cal or cultural source (e.g., black people’s anger is pathological, or women 
are just emotional). Thus, if gaslighting is successful, it can reinforce racial 
norms such as “people of color are too sensitive,” “black women are angry,” 
or “black people see race where it is not.” It also relies on the internalization 
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of these racial norms.6 If the gaslighting is successful, it can affect how black 
women, for example, see themselves—for they may soon take themselves to 
just be “an angry black woman” who should “get over it because it was not 
that serious to begin with.”
The gaslighter commits an epistemic error because he never gives serious 
consideration to the cause of the anger and instead dismisses it and takes it 
as a misreading by the angry agent. In turn, he destroys the possibility of dis-
agreement by destroying the source of the disagreement. He is right after all 
because he (the TA) has not actually engaged in racist behavior, and for the 
Smallville resident, the police mistreatment is not systematic. He does this by 
convincing himself and the angry agent that the agent is just too sensitive to 
see what he sees or what he wants the angry agent to see. Because the angry 
agents are too sensitive to see it, their angry expressions should not be trusted.
However, the anger evaluator as gaslighter is committing the epistemic 
error of relying too heavily on his own beliefs and assumptions. He is taking 
no consideration of outside evidence, evidence he needs to conclude if the 
anger is appropriate or proportionate. This is also a character error. The eval-
uator lacks intellectual humility. He thinks he is the only source of knowledge 
or that he is the epistemic authority and aims to convince the angry agent that 
she cannot be because of who she is.
The gaslighting evaluator also lacks epistemic charity. The anger evalua-
tor as gaslighter gives no credibility to the angry agent’s testimony because 
according to the evaluator, she already has no credibility so she is just over-
reacting (Abramson 2014: 17). This lack of credibility is due to the angry 
agents’ social position. Gaslighting is directed at women, people of color, 
and other minority groups because they are perceived to have no credibility 
by the fact that they are minorities or members of an oppressed group. The 
evaluator engages in testimonial injustice through gaslighting because the 
credibility of the Arab American student is lost due to this identity prejudice, 
not due to the facts of the matter. The “angry black person” by the fact that 
she is black is therefore not a knower. The evaluator concludes and wants the 
angry agent to also believe that “black people are always angry so they can’t 
properly understand when real wrongdoing has actually occurred.” This is 
why the angry agent concludes that the anger has pathological and biological 
origins rather than origins steeped in social facts.
As a result the anger evaluator as gaslighter has what Jose Medina refers to 
as epistemic vices which are “structural and systematic . . . [and] involve[s] atti-
tudes deeply rooted in one’s personality and cognitive functioning . . . they affect 
one’s capacity to learn from others and from the facts” (Medina 2012: 31). These 
vices are what Medina refers to as continual epistemic neglect. They prevent 
one from learning what the experiences of others are. Without this knowledge, 
however, one cannot properly make anger evaluations.
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CONSIDERATIONS
I have aimed to show that we properly evaluate anger according to its intel-
ligibility, appropriateness, and proportionality. In order to do this properly, an 
anger evaluator must know the causes of the anger, the effects of the anger, 
relevant facts about the agent, and other information. While we often imme-
diately approve or disapprove of anger through Smithian sympathy, there is 
no guarantee that we will properly evaluate anger given this procedure. We 
are able to sympathize more with those closer to us than those who are farther 
away. This is possible because the closeness of the relationship provides us 
with more epistemic resources needed to properly evaluate anger than the 
distant relationship. As a result, it is quite natural for us to immediately make 
more proper anger evaluations of those we know than those we do not know.
This is no reason to fret. We are not obligated to make immediate evalu-
ations nor should we be in a hurry to do so. Properly evaluating anger takes 
time, and it takes information. Thinking we have acquired enough of both 
in order to properly evaluate political anger should always give us reason to 
doubt that we actually have. Even if we do have time and information, I have 
argued that we often rush the evaluation or dismiss the information due to 
our biases, overconfidence, and selfish motives through anger policing and 
gaslighting.
Therefore, I suggest that while approving and disapproving of anger is 
something we tend to do, perhaps we should put our focus elsewhere. When 
people are politically angry, perhaps the best we can do is listen to their angry 
complaint instead of thinking we can succeed in the position of judge. If we 
are anxious to play judge, perhaps the most competent judges we can be are 
evaluators of the effects of political anger (e.g., the angry person’s actions) 
rather than evaluators of the anger. This is not to say that we should never 
evaluate anger. However, I hope I have demonstrated that we have justified 
reasons to doubt that we can be proper anger evaluators in all cases.
NOTES
 1. Roberts uses the term “mistake” instead of “error.” I prefer to use “error” 
because I think it captures both intentional and unintentional aspects of the act.
 2. Peter Goldie has argued that how we evaluate moral anger based on its fitting-
ness, intelligibility, and proportionality is a cultural matter. On his view, different 
cultures have different standards for measuring them.
 3. This is not to suggest that there are instances where there can be an anger 
object but a person is unaware of it at a subconscious level.
 4. We also bring a worldview, normative principles, morality, and so on with us 
in sympathizing.
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 5. Thanks to Sam Fleischacker for helping me to see the benefits of sympathy.
 6. Abramson (2014: 3) focuses on sexist norms. Here I emphasize racial norms.
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